Sublime

Both Napoleon and George W. Bush fell victim to the alignment problem. Their short-term military goals were misaligned with their countries’ long-term geopolitical goals. We can understand the whole of Clausewitz’s On War as a warning that “maximizing victory” is as shortsighted a goal as “maximizing user engagement.” According to the Clausewitzian

The situation was analogous to the first week in November 1918. Then as now the Germans were deep inside France and their lines were holding firm. But Hindenburg and Ludendorff knew it was only a matter of time until the Allies broke through, and that when they did they could not be contained. And so out of the blue, as it were, Hindenburg and Lude

War is profitable only if victory is quickly gained. Only an aggressor can hope to gain a quick victory. If he is frustrated, the war is bound to be long, and mutually ruinous, unless it is brought to an end by mutual agreement.

Ike learned to be tougher with subordinates such as Fredendall.

“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.”

For whoever habitually suppresses the truth in the interests of tact will produce a deformity from the womb of his thought.

Only second to the futility of pursuing ends reckless of the means is that of attempting progress by compulsion. History shows how often it leads to reaction. It also shows that the surer way is to generate and diffuse the idea of progress—providing a light to guide men, not a whip to drive them. Influence on thought has been the most influential f

Conner told his protégé: “In all military history, only one thing never changes—human nature. Terrain may change, weather may change, weapons may change … but never human nature.”

Any plan for peace is apt to be not only futile but dangerous. Like most planning, unless of a mainly material kind, it breaks down through disregard of human nature.