Pseudonymous Reputation

Drawing on our knowledge of economic theory and game design, we argue for a reputation system design based on a pair of tokens—one for signaling reputation and the other for offering liquidity—which could serve as tangible representations of meaningful contributions.

Additionally, there’s a whole class of applications based around the use of reputation to incentivize new forms of creation or contribution. Currently, it is difficult to decipher who is a subject-matter expert and to recognize and reward them. With decentralized identities that track contributions across the internet, we will be better able to gau... See more

As discussed, the hardest part of this seems to be assessing the value of contributions. In the short-term, this is inevitably quite subjective and requires a largely qualitative assessment. Over time, we’ll be able to design governance mining distribution mechanisms that are quantitatively driven, creating greater efficiency & less subjectivity th... See more

Contributors must be able to port their body of work across organizations. In the current labor system, workers are made legible by the institutions they belong to. A worker's entire identity—their work, reputation, relationships—exists in the blackbox of an insular permission-controlled database. Once a worker leaves the organization, their identi... See more

Reputation, quality of work, social capital and experience are already being used by DAOs to make decisions about how to treat specific members, but if these qualities could be inferred from an on-chain record, DAOs would become more autonomous and permissionless. Decisions could be made automatically, such as unlocking new spaces or granting great... See more