Sublime

Tajfel découvrit que ses sujets affichaient une nette préférence pour les membres de leur propre groupe, refusant d’adopter une stratégie de distribution égalitaire, et récompensant de manière disproportionnée ceux à qui ils s’identifiaient désormais. D’autres chercheurs ont réparti des individus dans différents groupes selon des stratégies encore

the amount we’re willing to pay for things often depends, to a large degree, on how fair the price appears to be.

It is not objective effort so much as the appearance of effort that drives the psychology of what we are willing to pay.

that cooperation in repeated public goods games can be increased if players are allowed to punish noncooperators at their own expense.

a large proportion of people can be categorized as conditional cooperators, meaning that they are willing to cooperate if enough others do.

Two University of Zurich researchers were equally curious: The Swiss nuclear incentive study, titled “The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out,” was conducted by Bruno S. Frey and Felix Oberholzer-Gee. It was published in the American Economic Review 87 (1997): 746–55. forty students sat with number 2 pencils:

People actually refuse free money in order to punish someone—someone they don’t know and probably won’t deal with ever again—just for making an unfair offer. These results show that we can value a dollar at less than zero because of our sense of fairness.