Sublime

Brownell and Clay had made the tactical decisions that helped him get elected, and Eisenhower trusted their judgment. They knew the political landscape better than he, and not surprisingly he turned to them for the selection of his cabinet.

signaled for Landsbergis that it was time to go.

They resounded in the administration’s respect for the “international community,” a grouping that included North Korea, Pakistan, and Sudan, and which many Israelis considered an oxymoron.

Eisenhower expected the cabinet to present options and argue with one another about the superiority of one course of action or another—just as Bradley and Montgomery might have done. The one thing they were not permitted to do was raise matters that pertained solely to their own departments. Eisenhower thought that was something for each of them to

great power competition.

Barack Obama came to see it as an alternative to the messy, costly wars that topple governments and require years of American occupation. In the words of John Brennan, one of President Obama’s closest advisers whom Obama eventually tapped to run the CIA, instead of the “hammer” America now relies on the “scalpel.”

As a military statesman, Ike’s emphasis on team play, his willingness to compromise, and his ability to reconcile diverse interests were unique assets. But as a field commander, where decisiveness is essential, Eisenhower’s preference for consensus became a liability.

Fourth, we would not assume linear progress toward our objectives and would instead acknowledge the degree of agency that others (whether the authoritarian powers Russia and China, transnational threats such as jihadist terrorist organizations, hostile states such as Iran or North Korea, or multiple actors in emerging arenas of competition in cyber

First, our NSC process would deliver options to advance and protect the interests of the American people and overcome national security challenges.