possibility studies

(4) The dominant notion of reality is deeply related to the fact that we (moderns) believe in science and abstract knowledge as arbitrators of truth, in the autonomous and competitive individual as the kernel of society, and in the economy as a separate domain ruled by “free markets.” These entangled set of beliefs have created the modern idea that

The science-fiction writer William Gibson suggested that in his lifetime, the future ‘has been a cult, if not a religion’, but that this has waned.4 Future fatigue has set in instead.5 The Brazilian polymath Roberto Unger put the problem starkly: we suffer from a dictatorship of no alternatives.

While scientific progress, then, proceeds by curiously exploring adjacent possibilities, preference is given to work closely tied to existing science and conducted by a privileged subset of scientists.

As stated by Glăveanu (2022) in his Manifesto, “[t]he possible re-emerges as an organizing category in our lives and our thinking not despite but because of living through the seemingly impossible and unimaginable.” The possible, transitions, temporalities, and the pluriverse appear as part of the same complex process of civilizational transition.

The impossible we can imagine also serves as a mirror, confronting ourselves with our responses to the wide range of (im)possible scenarios. Why do we assume they are impossible to begin with? What is it about these boundaries that might make us feel uncomfortable? Can we see beyond that and expand our imagination even more?

the connectional account of curiosity also challenges the common-sense view of possibility as solely related to growth. While nodes can be added, they can also be removed or changed, and while edges can be added, they can also be broken and rewired

Sometimes, however, possibilities are quite old—longstanding and patient. And likewise, some curiosities are ancient—questions that have been either long-touted or long-buried. How might we dispel, then, the novelty bias to which curiosity and possibility are so regularly subject? How might we better appreciate curiosity and possibility wherever th

Large majorities of parents expect their children to be worse off than them, by a margin of 80 per cent to 15 per cent in France, 76 per cent to 15 per cent in Japan, 61 per cent to 19 per cent in Italy, and 57 per cent to 33 per cent in the traditionally optimistic United States.

Countries that used to define themselves through creating bold new institutions no longer do so—there are no recent equivalents to the NHS or the BBC in Britain; no equivalents of NASA or DARPA in the US. In much of academic life, too, you are more likely to succeed by slightly tweaking an established idea than creating a novel one.18