René Girard's Mimetic Theory (Studies in Violence, Mimesis & Culture)

Girard’s mimetic theory is based in essence on the literary insight into man’s unalterable religious nature. Looked at systematically, his position can be understood as follows: Human beings have the choice between recognition of the one true God and arbitrary idolatry.

We are not autonomous, self-sufficient individuals, but rather beings that are formed through the imitation of models, especially with regard to desire.

He argues that humans do not themselves know what to desire; as a result, they imitate the desires of others.

The French social philosopher Jean-Pierre Dupuy, in response to Girard, describes advertising very rightly as an intrinsic “paradox.” For, Dupuy says, the “paradise of non-imitation” can only be achieved “thanks to imitation.”

Girard expressly praises Sartre’s insistence on man’s “insurmountable” religious nature, in the wake of Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God.

As long as social difference or any other form of differentiation is present to channel mimetic desire, its conflictual dimension remains contained.

As the metaphysical distance between desiring subject and model diminishes—the key component of internal mediation—the potential for rivalry and violence increases.

To better understand this concept, we must examine Girard’s usage of the term “scapegoat” more closely. The term first appears in the book of Leviticus (16) and describes a rite in which the high priest symbolically laid the sins of the community on the back of a goat, which was then cast into the wilderness to the demon Azazel.

Not every instance of mimetic behavior, however, results necessarily in conflict. As long as desire is directed at an object that can be shared—learning a language, reading a book, listening to a piece of music, etc.—mimesis poses no problems. As soon as the object of desire can no longer be shared—as with objects of sexual desire, social positions