Mead (1934) proposes a distinction between two dynamic aspects of the self: the ‘me’ who moves through the social world, existing in complex social relations (Mead uses the analogy of play), and the ‘I’ whose exact definition proves difficult, but which represents a post hoc reflection on the actions, perceptions and understandings of the ‘me’.

Erving Goffman distinguishes, in his work on stigma (Goffman, 1968), between three forms of identity: personal identity (the unique characteristics of the person, both in themselves

have it, a unique and individual possession.

My sense of myself, others’ perceptions of me, my reactions to others’ perceptions, the social categories that attach themselves to me and to which I attach myself – all may be referred to as ‘identity’,

attempts to understand identity as process, as something achieved rather than something innate, as done rather than ‘owned’.

and in terms of their relations with others); social identity (what we might call a ‘categorical’ identity – an identity that persons have by virtue of their membership of social categories); and ego identity or felt identity.

Instead of seeing identity as something located ‘within’ the person – a property of the person, we might say – I consider it as something produced through social relations.

and the more personal, ambivalent, reflective

both its public manifestations – which might be called ‘roles’ or identity categories