Sublime

European armies had evolved into highly specialized machines to fight each other – but not to fight military forces whose ‘strategic doctrine’ was radically different. This was painfully apparent in the encounters between British troops and Native Americans in the 1750s.

Admiral King “listened with utmost enthusiasm,” wrote Captain James Doyle, Turner’s operations officer, when describing the UDT efforts at Flintlock. “Excellent,” King interrupted in the middle of Doyle’s briefing, “that business of the hydrographic survey at the first possible moment is a pet hobby of mine.” For Turner, however, a unit capable of

Mike Flynn, taught me a great technique. We were visiting a unit that boasted of having more than 250 intelligence sources (Iraqi civilians recruited to pass information to U.S. forces). I was deeply impressed. Mike then asked a simple question: “Can you describe your very best source? I’ll assume that all the others are less valuable.” The unit ad

On November 24, the day the battle for Tarawa ended, Turner’s staff forwarded a training syllabus to Lieutenant Thomas Crist, the commanding officer of the coral-blasting Seabee unit back in Hawaii, calling for the creation of two provisional units capable of dealing with underwater obstacles—something called the “underwater demolition teams,” or U

Fresh from the first successful ground reconnaissance in the Central Pacific Theater, General Smith sent forth his VAC Recon Company like the twelve spies into Canaan. At Majuro Atoll, one of the VAC Recon platoon commanders, Lieutenant Harvey Weeks—a former Yale wrestler, former attorney, and former enlisted man—captured the Japanese commander wit

Stuart Milner-Barry, one of the Hut 6 cryptanalysts, wrote: “I do not imagine that any war since classical times, if ever, has been fought in which one side read consistently the main military and naval intelligence of the other.”