Sublime

Sean Naylor’s Not a Good Day to Die (Naylor 2005) recounts the courage and organizational mishaps by SOF and coalition conventional forces in the one of the largest military operations in the post-9/11 era, Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, which took place in March 2002.

But the talks produced no progress. Abbas once again wanted to discuss borders first while Netanyahu responded that Israel could not discuss borders without knowing how those lines could be defended.

The major Western states ended the Cold War with a surplus of military power. Armies, navies and air forces constructed to fight a global war against the Eastern bloc suddenly were left without peer competitors. Western policymakers and their publics soon found new things to worry about, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, ethnic civil wars

My company was part of Brigade 401, in the Sinai. It was one of two armored forces that were rotated every three months into action on the front line. In a stroke of good fortune, the brigade commander was Dovik Tamari, Avraham Arnan’s first successor as commander of the sayeret. While we awaited our forward deployment, due in September, he include

Malcolm Brailey examined the argument that SOF capabilities had grown to the point that they constituted a viable alternative to conventional forces for some contingencies (Brailey 2005).

if the diagnosis is that Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is “another Hitler,” war might be the logical implication. However, if he is “another Moammar Gadhafi,” then strong pressure coupled with behind-the-scenes negotiation might be the chosen guiding policy.

SOF resource limitations may require SOF to collaborate with conventional forces in fighting insurgents and terrorists, but SOF should retain the lead in the collaborative relationship and control when and where conventional forces are used in support. This is because SOF’s intrinsic attributes—to the extent they have and safeguard them—give them a