Sublime

There frankly is a hell of a lot of value in the game theory and economics literature.

As a new point of view we turn to bounded rationality, a departure from the mainstream tradition. We no longer can assume that every agent is a perfect calculator. This point of view is given a great deal of emphasis by Herbert Simon. Simon argued that people do not maximize. When they’re forecasting the future, they do not perform the task of rati

Quadratic liquid democracy: As noted above, a natural way to avoid the power concentrations that liquid democracy can give rise to is the use of degressive proportionality. RadicalxChange, a non-profit advancing ⿻, has implemented a related system for its internal decision-making.

It traditionally assumed that firms were independent, and so changes would be independent, and so their sizes and aggregate effects would be distributed normally.

The demands of ⿻ identity systems supporting some of the above suggest that while voting in new transnational configurations is imaginable, systems of voting are unlikely any time soon to truly reach global legitimacy.

Rather, after a simulation is run a thousand or a million times, such models show policy makers the range of possible futures and their relative probabilities if policies remain unchanged. Then, by altering policies in the model and running them another million times, we might begin to understand paths to better futures.

Markets are driven by the actions of countless individuals, each reacting to his or her whims, the weather, and the news of the day. Remarkably, just as with army ants, out of all our individual actions emerges a higher order, a set of prices that allows us to buy and sell whatever we may desire.

Formal procedures include:

We have an alternative solution, ergodicity economics, which has replaced the expectation value of the operator on this random object with a time average, or time average growth.