Sublime

Following the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of a common threat, it has proved more difficult for Europe to maintain stability, democracy, and prosperity.

While Europe is where much of twentieth-century history took place, it is less likely that either Europe or European countries will occupy so central a role in this century.

Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.

Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.

Europe, as noted earlier, has in a short span of time gone from being the most predictable and stable region—one where history seemed to have truly ended (as suggested in an influential essay published in 1989 by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama)—to something dramatically different. Democracy, prosperity, and peace all seemed firml

All of this suggests a future for the Middle East that is like its past, defined by violence within and across borders, little freedom or democracy, and standards of living that lag behind much of the rest of the world.

Where to intervene? Where to bring democracy? Where to nation-build? I propose a single criterion: where it counts. Call it democratic realism. And this is its axiom: We will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places where there is a strategic necessity—meaning, places central to the larger war against the e

The EU, by far the most significant regional arrangement, is struggling with disputes over migration, economic policy, and the division of responsibility between itself and its members. And around the world, countries are increasingly resisting U.S. primacy. For its part, the United States, divided politically and stretched militarily after prolong