Sublime

An inspiration engine for ideas

AllPeopleCollectionsArticlesAudioBooksFilesHighlightsImagesLinksNotesTextTweetsVideosSocial

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Elinor Ostrom,

Kate RAWORTH • La Théorie du donut

Self-Study Guide Weaving Networks for Systemic Change

Explores network weaving strategies to foster systemic change by building collaborative relationships, enhancing collective learning, embodying wellbeing, and providing curated resources and tools for impactful social innovation.

mcusercontent.com

Elinor Ostrom,

Nathan Schneider • Governable Spaces: Democratic Design for Online Life

She’s a Nobel Prize–winning economist who has identified eight features necessary to maintain a stable community property resource.1 This wisdom applies to many of the communities you’ll grow. While Ostrom’s work overlaps with ideas I have already shared, it focuses more on long-term community management than on creating belonging and is worth expl

Charles Vogl • The Art of Community: Seven Principles for Belonging

she sought to identify ten subsystem variables that affect the likelihood of successful self-organization of efforts to achieve a sustainable socio-ecological systems by the communities involved. Summarized in a simple form the ten variables were:

The size of resource system – a moderate territorial size is most conducive to self-organization.

The pr... See more

Wyn Grant • Elinor Ostrom’s work on Governing The Commons: An Appreciation - LSE Review of Books

The deep knowledge about a place is most likely held by farmers and engaged locals. But it is not likely to be in a form demanded by policymakers to substantiate calls for spending. It’s not just about quantifying, it’s about qualitative data of the kind that amounts to a form of collective intelligence.”

Creative Destruction • Rabbit Holes 🕳️ #84

Islands of Coherence - Future Observatory Journal

Justin McGuirk fojournal.org

It is likely instructive at this point to be clearer about how exactly Ostrom defines a common pool resource, and how she distinguishes it from a “public good.” She writes, The relatively high costs of physically excluding joint appropriators from the resource or from improvements made to the resource system are similar to the high costs of excludi