Sublime

‘Anselm's ontological argument’.1 In one version or another, ontological arguments are particularly appealing to many philosophers. This appeal has something to do with the remarkable fact that we are supposed to be able to find out, just by thinking correctly, all that we need to know to see them prove their point.

Robin Hanson and I share a belief that two rationalists should not agree to disagree: they should not have common knowledge of epistemic disagreement unless something is very wrong.

The philosopher Erik Wielenberg argues for this, what he calls “non-natural non-theistic moral realism.”

Something radically strange and counterintuitive must be true about the relationship between mind and world.

This correspondence between belief and reality is commonly called “truth

it always involves a metaphysics of transcendence.

something radically contrary to common sense must be true about the fundamental structures of the mind and the world, while leaving us poorly equipped to determine where exactly the truth lies among the various weird possibilities.