Sublime

When I commanded in Palestine in 1937–8, I had on my staff two officers in whom I recognised an original, unorthodox outlook on soldiering . . . One was Orde Wingate, the second was Dudley Clarke.

Now, in our work to develop integrated strategies for our most pressing national security challenges, we would provide the president with options differentiated by their level of risk to American interests and citizens, the resources required, and the prospect of their progressing toward national security and foreign policy goals and objectives. Th

ANDREW J. BACEVICH,

For Montgomery, given the horrendous British losses in the trench warfare of World War I, attrition was unthinkable. Instead, he preferred to keep the enemy off balance by maneuvering and then deliver a concentrated blow at a single point. Rather than conduct a broad-front offensive, Monty sought to breach the enemy line and exploit the breakthroug

I explained to him that I intended to draw on history to help frame contemporary challenges to national security. An important first step in developing policy and strategy, I believed, was to understand how the past produced the present. I also believed that the history of how previous presidents, their cabinets, and the National Security Council s

Christiaan Rudolf de Wet,

After the war there was disagreement over whether Delta had been responsible for the destruction of any real Scuds, with suggestions that many targets were decoys. However, there was no disputing that once JSOC’s campaign in western Iraq began, the number of Scuds fired declined by 80 percent, to an average of just one launch per day. The war ended

U.S. Special Operations Command Fact Book (U.S. Special Operations Command 2018)