Sublime

“I can make a decision with 30 percent of the information,” said former secretary of state Colin Powell. “Anything more than 80 percent is too much.”

Eisenhower enjoyed an exemplary reputation as a staff officer. For eighteen years he had amassed an uninterrupted string of “superior” ratings in jobs of increasing complexity. First with Fox Conner in Panama, then with Pershing, then George Moseley, and finally with MacArthur, he had demonstrated an exceptional capacity to produce under pressure.

He had no combat experience, and his only command position in the past twenty years had been an infantry battalion at Fort Lewis.

“His reliance on the staff system stopped at the deciding line. His grasp of complex issues was profound, and his exposition of his own views was forceful and clear.” The mythical Eisenhower, who left decision making to subordinates, whose mind was “lazy” and who was not very bright, cannot be found in the minutes of the National Security Council,

In a presentation I heard General McChrystal give at the New York Times New Work Summit in the summer of 2016, he said, “I tell people, ‘Don’t follow my orders. Follow the orders I would have given you if I were there and knew what you know.’”

Brownell and Clay had made the tactical decisions that helped him get elected, and Eisenhower trusted their judgment. They knew the political landscape better than he, and not surprisingly he turned to them for the selection of his cabinet.

Eisenhower, who was solicitous about the welfare of his staff,

As Murray Kempton put it, Ike would not have trusted Dulles “with a stick of dynamite to blow up a duck pond,” but found him useful for clearing minefields.