Sublime
An inspiration engine for ideas
Hybrid capabilities were most useful in converting conventional forces to the exigencies of irregular war, as against fighting a hybrid foe, which really were common only in the eighteenth century. For Britain, the normal problem in hybridity was in recalibrating forces from one task to another rather than in handling two competitions at once. Fail
... See moreWilliamson Murray • Hybrid Warfare
To compound the problem, Gerow disregarded the lessons of North Africa, Sicily, and Salerno, and launched his attack frontally at German strong points rather than assaulting them from the flank or rear. That was the head-on doctrine preferred by General Marshall and which was taught in the Army’s advanced schools. Gallantry, it was believed, would
... See moreJean Edward Smith • Eisenhower in War and Peace
Gerow’s refusal to bend textbook tactics to the reality of amphibious warfare was a classic example of military hubris.
Jean Edward Smith • Eisenhower in War and Peace
I have come to think that accuracy, in the deepest sense, is the basic virtue—the foundation of understanding, supporting the promise of progress. The cause of most troubles can be traced to excess; the failure to check them to deficiency; their prevention lies in moderation. So in the case of troubles that develop from spoken or written communicat
... See moreB.H. Liddell Hart • Why Don't We Learn from History?
“His reliance on the staff system stopped at the deciding line. His grasp of complex issues was profound, and his exposition of his own views was forceful and clear.” The mythical Eisenhower, who left decision making to subordinates, whose mind was “lazy” and who was not very bright, cannot be found in the minutes of the National Security Council,
... See moreJean Edward Smith • Eisenhower in War and Peace
The increasing specialization of history has tended to decrease the intelligibility of history and thus forfeit the benefit to the community—even
B.H. Liddell Hart • Why Don't We Learn from History?
Jan Christiaan Smuts,
Max Boot • Invisible Armies
only rarely consulted the text in front of him.
Jean Edward Smith • Eisenhower in War and Peace
Gubbins and his colleagues consciously looked to past and contemporary examples for their inspiration.