Sublime

Der zweite Grund ist, dass die meisten Nationalstaaten nach wie vor ihr Verhältnis zu Feinden, die ihre Grenzen, ihre wirtschaftlichen Interessen oder ihren politischen Einfluss bedrohen, im Blick behalten und regeln.

it is organized to focus on a response to that particular threat, rather than dissipate its attention. In World War II, it was Germany and Japan. In the Cold War, it was the Soviet Union and China.

When we do, we assume the politicians are clients in a patron–client relationship, and we assume their obligations will cloud their impartial judgment.

A significant faction of Americans have lost confidence in the federal government through the belief that the technocrats are acting not in the best interests of the citizenry but rather to protect their position and power in government.

The decision-making structure in Washington is complex, diffuse, and at odds with itself. It has streamlined itself not for routine decisions but primarily for crises.

The institutional crisis is rooted in two things. First, the governing class, and the technocrats, accumulate power and wealth, and they begin to shape the institutions to protect their interests. The second problem is that the expertise that won World War II and built the postwar world is now encountering its own problem of inefficiency—diffusion.