Sublime

The problem for General Motors, as I saw it in 1922, was to get the advantages of volume by buying on general contracts such items as tires, steel, stationery, rags, batteries, blocks, acetylene, abrasives, and the like, and at the same time to permit the divisions to have control over their own affairs. In a preliminary memorandum I argued that

The core of our concept lay in the determination of the propriety of proposed projects. Four principles were to be satisfied, which we stated as follows: a. Is the Project a logical or necessary one considered as a commercial venture? b. Has the Project been properly developed technically? c. Is the Project proper, considering the interest of the

General Motors had come to own the manufacturers of 70 percent of everything that went into its automobiles—and had become by far the world’s most integrated large business. It was this prototype keiretsu that gave General Motors the decisive advantage, both in cost and in speed, which made it within a few short years both the world’s largest and

Depois que deixei Detroit Edison um grupo formou a Detroit Automobile Company para fabricar o meu carro, ficando eu como engenheiro chefe, com uma pequena parte das ações. Durante três anos construímos carros mais ou menos conformes ao meu modelo. Vendíamos pouco e não pude arrastar meus associados a uma produção popular. A preocupação era produzir

The basic elements of financial control in General Motors are cost, price, volume, and rate of return on investment.

The slump had the effect of showing up all kinds of weaknesses, as slumps usually do. General Motors in 1920 had enjoyed 17 percent of the U.S. car and truck market; in 1921 we were on our way down to 12 percent. Ford, on the other hand, was in the course of rising from 45 percent of the market in units in 1920 to 60 percent in 1921. In other

As to organization, we did not have adequate knowledge or control of the individual operating divisions. It was a management by crony, with the divisions operating on a horse-trading basis.

When I was chief executive officer of General Motors, I gave a large part of my attention to dealer relations, amounting at times, you might say, almost to a specialization. I did so because the experience of the 1920s, when the modern problems of automobile distribution took shape, taught me that a stable dealer organization is a necessary

These stockholders had originally put up $33,100. Sixteen years later they sold out for more than $105,000,000. Also, in those sixteen years, their total dividends were more than $30,000,000.