Decolonisation, co-liberation and emancipation

Fourth, belonging requires agency. Agency is the sense or feeling of control people have over actions and their consequences. Belonging requires a meaningful degree of actual agency in relation to the object of belonging. If barriers are removed, objective disparities are eliminated or reduced, recognition is accorded, and connection is forged, but agency is denied, then belonging is unlikely exist. Or if inclusion occurs, but some participants are given a voice and a say, but others are denied it, then belonging is thwarted for those who are treated less generously.

The requisite of agency brings power into the belonging formula. To have agency, one must individually and collectively have the power to act and the potential to influence. This goes beyond the classic formulation of “voice.” Having a voice means being heard, which is largely a corollary to being recognized or visible, our third definitional element. Agency goes beyond voice to “say,” or influence. Having a say does not necessarily mean getting one’s way, but it does entail more than the right to be heard; it means some degree of capacity to shape the proceedings or the deliberations. To foster belonging, we call for the empowerment of people, especially those from marginalized groups, to be able to fully participate in society. Belonging will arise when institutions and communities take steps to facilitate agency so that these participants ultimately feel that they have a say.

This article elicits two overlapping frameworks in which emancipation has been understood and applied to women. The first distinguishes between a) an original definition grounded in Roman Law and defined as release from slavery and b) an Enlightenment sense in which an emancipatory process is associated with a critical ethos. I derive this latter meaning from an analysis of Kant's and Foucault's respective essays on enlightenment. Although they agree that emancipation is an ongoing critical task, I emphasize two aspects of Foucault's version: his attention to practices of liberty that entail bodily as well as subjective reconstruction and his inclusion, among topics for critique, of modernity's ontology of the human subject. In the case of women's emancipation, I argue that both aspects of emancipation must proceed simultaneously because of the distinctive nature of their oppression. For second‐wave feminism, I note a continued, although reoriented, equation between women and slaves. But now I identify a further framework whereby emancipation emerges as a threefold although systemic undertaking in which legal, subjectivist, and economic dimensions are at stake. I argue in conclusion that each entails unfinished emancipatory projects that represent timely ways to revive emancipation in the twenty‐first century.