The American, British and French armies have undertaken a number of innovations in attempting to transform themselves for the post-Cold War world. One innovation, in particular, stands out, namely, the development of networked forces. Another significant innovation is British and French doctrine on the effects-based approach to operations. Finally,

The major Western states ended the Cold War with a surplus of military power. Armies, navies and air forces constructed to fight a global war against the Eastern bloc suddenly were left without peer competitors. Western policymakers and their publics soon found new things to worry about, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, ethnic civil wars

Military power is more than the accumulation of material resources. It is a product of how states mobilize, exploit and use resources to generate military force, and how forces are employed in the field.1 Viewed thus, the importance of military innovation becomes clear. Militaries that fail to innovate, and enter war with obsolete ways and means of

The general spent much of his first year in office trying to convince the Army of the urgent need to transform itself and of his vision for the future information technology-based Army. His argument, as he admitted, “[d]idn’t get much traction.”164 A key problem, as Shinseki perceived it, was that soldiers were closely tied to their specialization

Transforming Military Power since the Cold War

During the Cold War, expeditionary missions had been assigned to specialized units – the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions in the US Army, the Parachute Regiment in the British Army, and the Foreign Legion in the French Army.

This book provides an authoritative account of how the US, British, and French armies have transformed since the end of the Cold War.

the authors examine both the process and the outcomes of army transformation, and ask how organizational interests, emerging ideas, and key entrepreneurial leaders interact in shaping the direction of military change.

CENTCOM’s plan for a large-scale invasion of Afghanistan was rejected by US national command authorities in favor of an innovative plan proposed by the Director of the CIA. CIA field teams were inserted into Afghanistan in order to direct US money and air power to support a renewed offensive by the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. US Army special fo