Patañjali defines ignorance in exactly the same terms as used by the Buddha, with one essential and dramatic reversal. Instead of ignorance being defined as the notion that takes the self, which is joyful, pure, and eternal, to be the nonself, which is painful, impure, and temporary, as Patañjali has done here, Buddhist teachings consider ignorance

only the kleśas other than ignorance can be found in a dormant state. Ignorance is never dormant, since it is the cause and support of the others and thus is always manifest.

the ascetic tradition tends to view the body as a rather unpleasant bag of obnoxious substances.

like to imagine that Patañjali is too sophisticated and broad-minded a thinker to risk sectarianizing the otherwise universalistic tenor of the sūtras and thereby alienating the sensitivities of aspiring yogīs with theistic (or nontheistic) orientations different from his own.

When the citta mind has cultivated a state of almost pure sattva,26 the discriminative aspect of buddhi, intelligence, can reveal the distinction between the ultimate conscious principle, the puruṣa soul, and even the purest and most subtle (but nonetheless unconscious) states of prakṛti.

yoga need not be perceived as a world-renouncing tradition but is perfectly compatible with engaged and benevolent social action in the world.

As yoga was defined in I.2 in terms of the suppression of vṛttis, so here kriyā-yoga is defined in terms of the weakening, tanū-karaṇa, of what we will discover are the underlying cause of the vṛttis, the kleśas.

Yoga involves preventing the mind from being molded into these permutations, the vṛttis, the impressions and thoughts of the objects of the world, such that puruṣa can regain its autonomous nature.

kriyā-yoga being more action oriented, devotion to Īśvara takes the form of renunciation of self-centered deeds and the offering of action to God.