The End of the World is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization

nearly all the population gains in the developed world since 1965—overall a greater than 50 percent increase—are from longer life spans.

The American-led Order (big O) did more than change the rules of the game; it institutionalized order (little o), which in turn allowed industrialization and urbanization to spread everywhere. That shifted the global demographic from one of lots of children to lots of young and mature workers, generating a sustained consumption and investment boom

Every time there’s a tweak to a demand profile—either for intermediate or finished goods—it typically takes a year of retooling efforts to work its way forward and back through the system. We have learned that little lesson the hard way with COVID. Every ship diverted, every shot fired disrupts some part of the supply and forces that same year-long

As the decades ticked into centuries, expectations changed because the economics changed. No longer was the pie singular and stagnant. It was growing. It would never stop growing. And that, above all else, is the world we know. More products. More players. Bigger markets. More markets. Easier transport. More interconnectivity. More trade. More capi

There will be American exceptions. The world’s best geography will keep development costs low. The rich world’s best demography will make America’s capital cost increases less onerous. The rise of the American Millennials suggests that by the 2040s—when the Millennials finally age into that capital-rich age bracket—capital supply will once again ri

The American Millennials’ numbers raise the possibility that they will have enough children to someday fill the labor gap. But the soonest that will happen is when those children enter the labor force . . . a process that will not begin until the mid-2040s. And there is still risk here: there’s the not-so-minor issue that the Millennials must first

China sits at the end of the world’s longest supply routes for nearly everything it imports, including roughly 80 percent of its oil needs. China’s navy lacks the range necessary to secure, via trade or conquest, agricultural products—or even the inputs to grow and raise its own. China’s demographic collapse suggests imminent labor force and capita

while many might reasonably argue such has always been the case, what made the Order work is that we all collectively agreed that there were limits as to what form intrastate competition could take. No one uses military force to confront an economic competitor. But most important, no one shoots at or hijacks commercial shipping. Period. The end of

In a world of circumscribed shipping, the inputs needed to maintain modern manufacturing systems—a long list of materials that range from high-grade silicon to cobalt to nickel to rare earths to bauxite—are going to be top-tier targets. It’s far easier to nab those slow-moving bulk ships than to occupy a country for its mining capacity.