One of the epitaphs on Colleoni, who died in 1475 after being Venetian captain general for twenty years, suggested that ‘he who serves a republic serves no one’. This was a common reference to the vacillating quality of leadership in the Italian republics, and it has been suggested that condottieri preferred to serve under princes where they knew

It was part of the early myth of Venice that her policies were not directed by individuals but by some sort of corporate awareness of the eternal needs of the Republic. Niccolò Piccinino is said to have remarked on one occasion that he would like to serve Venice ‘because while princes are mortal, the Republic will never die’.

The Italian republics, Florence and Venice, were often loth to give sweeping powers to a soldier. It meant paying a high salary as well as running the risks of a military coup. There was a lingering belief that it was better to employ all the good condottieri available and hope that they would seek to excel each other, even if cooperation between

Mercenaries live on war; when peace is signed they have only three choices: to retire to some base and live off their inflated seasonal earnings, to seek another war, or to create for themselves artificial conditions of war by becoming outlaws.

Their concern was not to annihilate their rivals, but to achieve security and predominance within clearly defined spheres of influence. Their population resources were a good deal more limited than their wealth, and so their weapons were small professional mercenary armies, the activities of which were related to the needs and intentions of the

Although a great deal has been written about a sudden transformation in the Italian military scene round about 1300 when professional mercenaries replaced largely native troops, either feudal or communal, as the main components of Italian armies, it is the change from employing mercenaries as individuals to employing them in companies which is

Some of the earliest mercenary companies originated as the bodyguards of civic officials.

The city militias were divided into companies from different quarters of the city, and it was rarely necessary to call out more than a part of the force at once. Each man was expected to keep his arms, and where applicable his horse, in readiness; but the service required of him was normally confined to defence of the walls of the city for the

That these arrangements were either a novelty for France or unique in Europe is now very much questioned by historians, but they do help us to define what is meant by a standing army. First, such an army is organised on a permanent, professional footing; secondly it consists of companies of equal size, uniformly armed according to an overall plan;