
Israel and the Bomb

In May 1967, unlike in 1960, Dimona was an important indicator for both sides. If Egypt intended to provoke hostilities with Israel, Dimona would be a most attractive target. For Israel, an aerial attack against Dimona would be a reason to go to war. Shortly before the Six-Day War, Yigal Allon, then a member of the Defense Ministerial Committee, up
... See moreAvner Cohen • Israel and the Bomb
On the evening of 17 May, General Aharon Yariv, the head of the Intelligence Branch, altered the basic assessment he had provided during the previous two days: Egypt’s intentions were no longer benign, they appeared to be aggressive.52 That night Eshkol and Rabin decided to call up tens of thousands of additional reserves. By late that evening Eshk
... See moreAvner Cohen • Israel and the Bomb
On 21 May the concerns over Dimona were raised in a meeting of the Defense Ministerial Committee. Eshkol expressed his fear that perhaps the Egyptian intent was to attack Dimona: “In my opinion, the Egyptians would act to stop Israeli shipping through the [Tiran] straits, and would bomb the Dimona reactor. A full military assault could follow.”55 B
... See more