Heidegger and the Death of God: Between Plato and Nietzsche

the atheist and reductionist accounts of being proposed (axiomatically) by modern science and technology, fails to account

because Nietzscheanism collapses into absurdity in its inability to account and explain the intelligibility of reality itself, only a Platonism and Cartesianism of sorts can adequately account for reality in a consistent and intelligible manner.

I frame this argument in terms of the “ontological status” of intelligibility (being, truth, etc.) and argue that if any metaphysics (scientific or otherwise) fails to account for such intelligibility, then it fails necessarily, as it cannot explain or account for its purported ability to explain or account

explain

It seems to me, for reasons I will later outline, the only way to properly pose and answer this question in a modern context is through Heidegger’s engagement with Nietzsche, since this engagement, in particular, seeks to think through and combat the metaphysics of modernity by using Nietzsche as its representative.

It is precisely this question that Plato posed initially in his Sophist concerning the Gigantomachy

intelligible grounds such as being and truth.

My conclusions have direct implications for the viability of a Platonic and theistic account of reality over and against a Nietzschean and atheistic one.

concerning the nature of being itself.