maxim

On the Stoic view, unlike the Aristotelian, aretê is essentially a singular expression and its possession by an individual an all or nothing matter; either someone possesses that perfection which aretê (virtus and honestas are both used as Latin translations) requires or he does not. With virtue one has moral worth; without it one is morally

Hence a rational morality will lay down principles which both can and ought to be held by all men, independent of circumstances and conditions, and which could consistently be obeyed by every rational agent on every occasion. The test for a proposed maxim is then easily framed: can we or can we not consistently will that everyone should always act

concession

virtue

The best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are no such rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no witches and the best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no unicorns: every attempt to give good reasons for believing that there are such rights has failed.

Hence Nietzsche’s prophetic irrationalism—irrationalism because Nietzsche’s problems remain unsolved and his solutions defy reason—remains immanent in the Weberian managerial forms of our culture. Whenever those immersed in the bureaucratic culture of the age try to think their way through to the moral foundations of what they are and what they do,

The expert’s claim to status and reward is fatally undermined when we recognize that he possesses no sound stock of law-like generalizations and when we realize how weak the predictive power available to him is.

The man therefore who does what he ought moves steadily towards his fate and his death. It is defeat and not victory that lies at the end. To understand this is itself a virtue; indeed it is a necessary part of courage to understand this.